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INTRODUCTION
rist who detonates a bomb ..., a
1

In 2005, a federal
court had no choice but to sentence Hungerford, a woman with severe borderline personality disorder and no criminal history, to 159
years in federal prison.2 Although Hungerford never handled a gun,
she was convicted of seven counts of using a firearm during a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).3 The Ninth Circuit upheld her
sentence, but not without condem
encing scheme that left the
court with no alternative.4
Section 924(c) criminalizes the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence or drug trafficking offense and provides harsh mandatory
minimum sentences.5 These sentences must be served consecutively
with the underlying crime and with each other.6 For instance, a
defendant convicted of two § 924(c) violations arising from a robbery
would first serve the sentence imposed for robbery.7 The defendant
would then serve the first § 924(c) sentence, followed by the second
§ 924(c) sentence.8
carries a five-, seven-, or tenyear sentence for possessing, brandishing, or discharging a firearm,

1. See United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., concurring) (second and fourth alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Rivera-Ruperto,
852 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2017) (Torruella, J., dissenting)). Mr. Rivera was sentenced to 161
years in prison, 130 of which resulted from six convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at 25.
2. See Clair Johnson,
eep Fighting 159 Year Sentence,
MONT. STANDARD (Dec. 9, 2007), https://mtstandard.com/news/state-and-regional/anacondawoman-s-daughter-to-keep-fighting-year-sentence/article_e82ad36a-42fc-5c53-b303-d24d
74988cca.html [https://perma.cc/UZQ6-NEQL].
3. United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 1118.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (C); see Hungerford, 465 F.3d at 1119.
6. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
7. See id.
8. Id.; see Hungerford, 465 F.3d at 1114; United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25,
42 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., concurring).
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respectively.9 This portion of the law remains the same today; however, the First Step Act substantively changed § 924(c) for the better
by limiting the potential sentence of a defendant charged with two
or more counts of § 924(c) in the same indictment.10
Before the First Step Act (FSA) passed on December 21, 2018,
11
federal courts were required to
This meant that second and subsequent convictions, even when
arising out of the same course of conduct, carried harsher penalties
than the first conviction.12 In other words, defendants with no criminal history were treated as repeat offenders and accordingly received harsher sentences. Under the prior version of § 924(c), each
stacked sentence carried an additional twenty-five years; as a result, defendants faced greater-than-life sentences.13 Take Marion
scheme. Hungerford was sentenced to four years for one count of
conspiracy and seven counts of robbery because all eight counts ran
concurrently.14
conviction because her co-defendant carried a gun during the robberies.15 Hungerford faced six
additional § 924(c) charges, and for each of these charges she received an additional twenty-five years, adding up to 155 years. 16 So,
9. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
10. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION
34-35 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2020/20200831_First-Step-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD6G-9B7Q].
11. Id.; see Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993).
12. U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra
tice of charging multiple
violations of section 924(c) within the same proceeding has commonly been referred to as
13. See id. at 1, 34-35; Rivera-Ruperto
924(c) did not merely permit this greater-than-life-without-parole
14. Hungerford v. United States, 465 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
15. Id.
Id.
twenty-six years moved out of their
house, Canfield swooped in as her new male companion. Id. Apart from driving Canfield to
and from the robberies, Hungerford had no active role in the crimes. Id. Canfield was the one
Id. at 1121. It is also important to note that, although
a gun was brandished, no one was physically harmed during this crime spree, and less than
$10,000 was stolen. Id. at 1119.
16. See id. at 1114. The prosecutor was not mandated to charge Hungerford with all seven
§ 924(c) charges. Id.
used his discretion to send the
mentally-ill Hungerford to prison until she turns 208, while he administered a far lesser
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on possessing a gun, which she in fact never carried.
Congress recognized these sentencing injustices and eliminated
the stacking provision of § 924(c) in the First Step Act.17 Under the
new scheme, multiple § 924(c) convictions arising out of the same
first and thus do not carry enhanced twenty-five-year sentences.18
In other words, first time § 924(c) offenders are no longer sentenced
as if they were repeat, career criminal offenders. As a result of this
change, second and subsequent convictions now carry the same sentence length as the first conviction: five, seven, or ten years.19 Had
Hungerford been sentenced in 2019, she would have received thirtyfive years on gun charges alone (seven five-year sentences), and her
total sentence would have amounted to thirty-nine years (adding an
additional four years for conspiracy and robbery). 20 Under the new
results in removing over a cen21

Fortunately, the First Step Act did not preclude Hungerford from
duce her sentence to seven years.22
Because Hungerford had already served seven years, she was eligible for release shortly thereafter.23 Many inmates, however, are
not afforded the same extraordinary prosecutorial discretion and
punishment ... to the principal who pu
Id.
17. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 35; see also United States v. Urkevich, No.
8:03CR37, 2019 WL 6037391, at *4 (D. Neb. Nov.
cing a term of incarceration forty years longer
than Congress now deems warrant
18. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 35.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22.
22. Emma Andersson, Why Low-Level Offenders Can Get Longer Sentences Than Airplane
Hijackers, ACLU (May 24, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/sentencing-reform/why-low-level-offenders-can-get-longer-sentences-airplane [https://perma.cc/T43M8W7Q].
23. Sentence Reduced, KULR8 (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.kulr8.com/news/sentencereduced/article_190ec1c0-ca91-58fa-af7a-614f79cfd403.html [https://perma.cc/MU6M-RTPW].
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instead remain behind federal prison bars serving decades upon decades of time under the previous § 924(c) sentencing scheme.
Although Congress did not retroactively apply its changes to
§ 924(c),24 it provided a glimmer of hope to defendants sentenced
under the old scheme. The First Step Act, in addition to changing
§ 924(c), significantly altered the compassionate release process.25
26

Before December 21, 2018, wardens within the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) could
file a motion for compassionate release with the courts based on
certain limited factors: terminal illness, age, extenuating family
27

Thus, the
BOP functioned as the sole gatekeeper of the release process.28
power to inmates, empowering
them to petition the courts directly for release.29
Once a defendant files a motion for compassionate release, the
court has the discretion to reduce
considering the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if
rant a reduction.30 Importantly, one of the sentencing factors in
warranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
31

This Note argues that courts are empowered to, and should, grant
compassionate release based solely on the sentencing disparities
24. See First Step Act § 403(b).
25. See id. § 603(b).
26. See FAMM, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND THE FIRST STEP ACT: THEN AND NOW 1,
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Compassionate-Release-in-the-First-Step-Act-ExplainedFAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UQC-ZBQM]; U.S. SENT G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(1)(A)
(U.S. SENT G COMM N 2018).
27. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 46; U.S. SENT G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.
28. See United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 726 (E.D. Va. 2020).
29. First Step Act § 603(b); see U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 47.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see First Step Act § 603(b).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol63/iss1/3

6

Williams: Taking the Second Step: Section 924(C) Sentencing Disparities as

2022]

TAKING THE SECOND STEP

33

ecifically, the significant changes
cently, district courts across the
country have granted motions for compassionate release based on
these sentencing disparities coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic
or significant rehabilitation.32 The pandemic and rehabilitation,
however, are relatively minor reasons for release when compared to
the injustice of defendants serving decades or centuries of time
greater than what Congress now deems sufficient.33 The First Step
Act provides courts significantly more power and discretion to reduce sentences based on extraordinary and compelling reasons.34
damental change in the law. Although Congress did not apply
troactively, this does not de. Congress likely saw a logistical
nightmare with releasing each defendant whose sentence would be
markedly lower under the new § 924(c) sentencing scheme, and
instead intended for a slower, individualized process through the
35
Thus, this Note argues
that district courts need not
efforts or health records when granting compassionate release
motions based on sentencing disparities. It is within the district

32. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 457 F. Supp. 3d 691, 701 (S.D.
ceptional rehabilitation; large sentencing disp
all constitute extraordinary and compelling re
States v. Decator, 452 F. Supp. 3d 320, 325-26 (D. Md. 2020) (granting
for compassionate release based on sentencing disparities and significant rehabilitation);
Bellamy v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 3d 777,
motion for compassionate release based on his young age at the time of offense, sentencing
disparities, and rehabilitative efforts).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Arey, 461 F. Supp. 3d 343, 351 (W.D. Va. 2020) (finding
sentencing disparity a more compelling reason for release than the COVID-19 pandemic).
34. STEPHEN R. SADY & ELIZABETH G. DAILY, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE BASICS FOR
FEDERAL DEFENDERS 1 (2019), https://or.fd.org/system/files/case_docs/Compassionate%20
Release%20Basics_REVISED_2templates.pdf [http
decades, the BOP claimed unlimited and unreviewable discretion .... All that has fundamentally changed because ... the President signed the First St
35. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271,
significant difference between automatic vacatur and resentencing of an entire class of seninevitable re-sentencings
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remedy these unjust sentences by
pointing to the sentencing disparity alone.
Part I of this Note provides background on the two relevant sections of the First Step Act: changes to the compassionate release
process and changes to the § 924(c) sentencing scheme. Part II
examines recent district court opinions addressing § 924(c) sentencreduced sentences. Part III argues that courts are empowered to
grant compassionate release to inmates convicted of multiple
§ 924(c) charges under the old sentencing scheme because of the
sentencing disparities the First Step Act created. Finally, the Note
concludes by urging courts to take the second step Congress was
unwilling to take itself.
I. THE FIRST STEP ACT: CREATING BOTH THE
PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION
Because Congress did not make its changes to the § 924(c)
stacking provision retroactive, defendants must seek relief from
their unjust sentences through the compassionate release process.
A defendant must convince a district court that it has the discretion
reasons for release, and that the non-retroactivity of the § 924(c)
reason for release.36
A. The Redeeming Feature of the First Step Act: Compassionate
Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress enacted
compassionate release, which allows federal prisoners to request a
sons.37 The Act abolished federal parole;38 as such, compassionate

36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 852 (2009).
38. Id. at 851.
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injustices.39 Initially, the BOP acted as the sole gatekeeper for com40

However, the BOP did not file
for compassionate release on behalf of inmates as often as Congress
had intended.41 As a result, Congress significantly altered the process in the First Step Act of 2018.42 The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), now allows defendants to petition the
court directly for release should the BOP deny or ignore their
request for release.43 This change effectively strips the BOP of its
gatekeeping role and empowers courts with a significant amount of
discretion.44 However, the compassionate release process is complex,
and portions of the relevant law have not been updated to reflect
the new amendment to § 3582.45
1. The Compassionate Release Statute
Section 3582(c) is the compassionate release statute;46 it governs
the modification of an imposed sentence based on extraordinary and
compelling reasons.47 The First Step Act amended the statute, empowering district courts to consider motions filed by defendants
directly rather than consider ones only filed by the BOP. 48 Now, a
defendant can bring a motion when
hausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau

39. See id. at 852.
40. SADY & DAILY, supra note 34, at 1.
41. See NIEMAN L. GRP. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE, THE FIRST STEP ACT, AND COVID-19:
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW 1-2 (2021), https://niemanlaw.com/compassionate-release/
[https://perma.cc/45YG-38BS].
42. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239-41;
SADY & DAILY, supra note 34, at 1; see also United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 725
passed against the backdrop of a documented
infrequency with which the BOP filed motions for a sentence reduction on behalf of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See SADY & DAILY, supra note 34, at 1; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 721, 726.
See infra Part I.A.2.
See SADY & DAILY, supra note 34, at 1.
See § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239.
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lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such request by the warden of
49

Once a motion is before the court, whether filed by a defendant or
the BOP, § 3582(c) requires the court to consider the applicable
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).50 Two factors are
particularly relevant to this No
51

parities among defendants with similar records who have been
52

After considering these factors, the court may reduce a sentence
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commis53

amended compassionate release process that sparks controversy. 54

When Congress created compassionate release in § 3582(c), it
mandated that the Sentencing Commission define the phrase
55
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)
should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for
criteria; and (3) provide a list of specific examples. 56 Congress made
clear, however, that the Commission should not define the defenalone
reason for release.57
Before November of 2007, the Sentencing Commission simply
did not comply with § 994(t).58 Its policy statement for § 3582(c),
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
See § 3582(c)(1)(A).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
§ 3553(a)(6).
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
See infra Part I.A.2.
See Berry, supra note 37, at 861.
28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
See id.
See Berry, supra note 37, at 861-62.
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37

enumerated in the sentencing guidelines at section 1B1.13, did not
tions or provide the applicable criteria.59 Instead, it recapitulated
§ 3852(c): it simply said that the BOP could determine what conexamples of what that could look like.60 Thus, the BOP truly had
complete discretion when making this determination as Congress
and the Commission provided the BOP with no guidance.61 Nevertheless, the compassionate release process continued without the
criteria and examples the Commission should have issued.
The Sentencing Commission fina
in late 2007.62 The Commission provided factual criteria and examples for the BOP to consider when determining whether an
63
In
particular, it listed four overarch
terminal illness); (2) age; (3) family circumstances; and (4) a catchall provision for other reasons.64
The catch-all provision is most important to defendants similarly
under the prior § 924(c) sentencing scheme.65 The catch-all provision
and compelling reason other than,
determined by the Director of the BOP.66 Importantly, this provision and
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.; U.S. SENT G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT G COMM N 2018).
See Berry, supra note 37, at 861-62.
See id.
See id. at 869.
See id.; U.S. SENT G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D) (U.S. SENT G
COMM N 2018).
64. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D); see U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 46.
65. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. Defendants incarcerated under the old
§ 924(c) sentencing scheme must show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release not
related to health, age, or family circumstances. Thus, they would have to be eligible for compassionate release under section 1B1.13 commentary note 1(D). Recently, however, district
courts have granted compassionate release under a combination of the catch-all provision and
the health provision based off of COVID-19 concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 457
F. Supp. 3d 691, 701 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (finding
combination with sentencing disparities constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release).
66. § 1B1.13 cmt. 1(D).
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the rest of the policy statement have not been updated to reflect the
67
The statement still functions, erroneously, under the assumption that a court
68

The outdated policy statement poses a problem for defendants
relying on the catch-all provision under section 1B1.13 commentary
note 1(D).69 When defendants invoke the provision advocating for
their release, courts are faced with the question of whether the
sons as identified by the BOP wardens.70 In other words, may a
court itself determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release? Nearly every court of apFirst Step Act.71 As such, courts, and not the BOP, have the discretion to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.72
In reaching this conclusion, circuit courts point to legislative
intent and the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A).73 In United States v. Brooker,
for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that
Congress did not view amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) to permit prisoner74

In fact, the court noted that

67. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 47. The Sentencing Commission explicitly
changes. The procedural change implemented by the First Step Act, however, is being successfully implemented, with defendants filing motions for and obtaining compassionate
Id.
68. See § 1B1.13; First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194,
5239.
69. See Bellamy v. United States, 474 F. Su
Prisons has the authority to determine whether

70. See id.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v.
Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 282 (4th
Cir. 2020). But see United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2021).
72. See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284.
73. See, e.g., Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235.
74. Id.
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75

76

39

Therefore, the court found that

Accordingly, the court determined that its

policy statement.77
District courts, understanding that they have the discretion to
still hesitate to grant compassionate release to defendants who did
not retroactively receive the sentence leniency of the § 924(c)
amendment. This Note argues that because courts can, in their
discretion, determine that sentencing disparities alone constitute an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release, they should in fact
do so.
B. The Harsh Realities of the First Step Act: Section 924(c)
Sentencing Disparities
On December 21, 2018, the day the First Step Act was enacted,
Kenya Preston Williams was arrested in Northern Virginia.78 A
federal grand jury had indicted him on ten counts based on a string
of armed convenience store robberies that occurred in 2016. 79
Williams, rather surprisingly, pled not guilty on all counts.80
Ultimately, Williams was convicted by a jury of one count of
conspiracy to commit robbery, three counts of federal robbery, three
counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 1; Arrest Warrant at 1, United States v.
Williams, No. 1:19-cr-00029 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Williams Arrest Warrant].
79. Indictment at 1-14, United States v. Williams, No. 1:19-cr-00029 (E.D. Va. Jan. 24,
2019) [hereinafter Williams Indictment].
80. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1, United States v. Williams, No. 1:19-cr-00029 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 13, 2019) [hereinafter Williams Judgment]; see also John Gramlich, Only 2% of
Federal Criminal Defendants Go To Trial, and Most Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-crim
inal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/U4MS-HY8F].
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brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c).81 In
September 2019, Williams was sentenced to twenty-three years in
federal prison.82 Two of these years are for the conspiracy, robbery,
and felon-in-possession charges; these sentences run concurrently. 83
The remaining twenty-one years are for the § 924(c) charges, calculated under the new sentencing scheme: seven years on each
count of brandishing a weapon, to run consecutively.84
Because Williams was sentenced after the First Step Act passed,
85
His co-defendant
was not so lucky. Steven Oneil Houston participated in the same
string of robberies.86 Between August and October of 2016, Houston
and Williams stole under $4,000 from 7-Eleven, Shell, and Exxon
convenience stores.87 The critical difference between the outcome of
timing.88
Houston was arrested on March 2, 2017.89 He was indicted on seven counts: one count of conspiracy, three counts of robbery, and
three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c).90 Interestingly, Williams brandished the firearm during
91
Because Houston had no
previous felony charges, he did not face the felon-in-possession
81. Williams Judgment, supra note 80, at 1-2.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 1-3.
84. Id.
85. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222;
Williams Judgment, supra note 80, at 3.
86. See Williams Indictment, supra note 79, at 3-5 (listing the overt acts Williams and
Houston took in furtherance of their robbery conspiracy).
87. See Indictment at 13, United States v. Houston, No. 1:18-cr-00127 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22,
2018) [hereinafter Houston Indictment].
88. The relevant date is sentencing. See First Step Act § 403(b). It is, however, ironic that
Williams was arrested on the same date the First Step Act passed.
89. Arrest Warrant at 1, United States v. Houston, No. 1:18-cr-00127 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3,
2018) [hereinafter Houston Arrest Warrant]. Arrest warrants for both Houston and Williams
were issued on December 16, 2016. Id.; Williams Arrest Warrant, supra note 78, at 1.
90. Houston Indictment, supra note 87, at 1-12.
91. The dates of the robberies Houston was charged with in Counts Two through Four of
his Indictment correspond to da
brandishing the firearm during the August 17,
2016, and October 21, 2016, robberies. Houston Indictment, supra note 87, at 3-9. It is clear
See id.; Williams Indictment, supra
note 79, at 3-5.
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charges that Williams did.92 Houston pled guilty on May 21, 2018,
to two of the § 924(c) charges.93 The presiding district court judge
sentenced Houston three months before his co-defendant was arrested and the First Step Act passed.94 Houston received seven years
on the first § 924(c) charge and twenty-five consecutive years on
the second § 924(c) charge.95
lutely no choice but to send Houston to federal prison for thirty-two
years.96
The sentencing disparities created
are not hypothetical.97 Steven Houston received a thirty-two year
sentence for two counts of brandishing a weapon that Kenya
Williams actually wielded.98 Meanwhile, Kenya Williams is serving
a twenty-three year prison sentence based on ten counts, three of
which resulted from § 924(c) charges.99 Williams had eight more
charges than his co-defendant but was sentenced to nine less
years.100 The difference? The date of arrest.

92. Houston, although charged with brandishing a firearm, was not indicted on any felonin-possession charges. Houston Indictment, supra note 87, at 1. This was the only difference
See id.; Williams Indictment, supra note 79,
at 1.
93. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Houston, No. 1:18-cr-00127 (E.D. Va. May 21,
2018) [hereinafter Houston Plea Agreement].
94. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 1; Williams Arrest Warrant, supra note 78,
at 1.
95. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Houston, No. 1:18-cr-00127 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 10, 2018).
96. See Houston Plea Agreement, supra note 93, at 1 (explaining the mandatory minimum
sentences under the old § 924(c) sentencing scheme).
97. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
98. See Houston Indictment, supra note 87, at 3-9; Williams Indictment, supra note 79,
at 3-5. Houston is currently incarcerated at FCI Fairton. Inmate Locator, FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS , https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ [https://per
99. Inmate Locator, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ [https://
supra note 80, at 3.
100. See supra notes 81-83, 89-95 and accompanying text. Rarely will sentencing disparities
be as drastic as Marion Hungerfo
however, to view the disparity in the
eyes of the defendant. Steven Houston faced approximately 3,285 more monotonous days in
federal prison than Kenya Williams based solely on the fact that he was arrested first.
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Congress explicitly made the chang
vision non-retroactive.101
surely Congress cannot believe that defendants convicted of multiple § 924(c) violations and sentenced before December 21, 2018, are
more dangerous or deserve more decades in prison than defendants
sentenced after December 21, 2018. Such a suggestion would be
absurd. Instead, Congress likely either: (1) failed to recognize the
grave injustices that would result from not applying the stacking
provision retroactively, or (2) believed that releasing inmates (without any individualized review) who were convicted of multiple
§ 924(c) charges would be a logistical nightmare. The latter is more
likely.
Of note, Congress empowered courts with broad discretion to
grant compassionate release in the same Act that it declared the
§ 924(c) provision changes non-retroactive.102 And, Congress also
eed to avoid unwarranted sentence
ations.103 Congress would not have explicitly enacted these two
inactivity in petitioning for compassionate release motivated Con104

Nonetheless, in the last two years district courts have been wary
of granting compassionate release based on sentencing disparities
alone.105 Instead, several courts have considered the disparities
alongside rehabilitation, age, and COVID-19.106
II. DISTRICT COURTS: CASE STUDIES
In November 2019, the Nebraska District Court granted Jerry
107
Between 2001 and

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
2019).

See First Step Act § 403(b).
See First Step Act §§ 403(b), 603(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 725 (E.D. Va. 2020).
See infra Part II.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
United States v. Urkevich, No. 8:03CR37, 2019 WL 6037391, at *1 (D. Neb. Nov. 14,
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2003, Urkevich ran a drug operation from his home in Omaha. 108
Law enforcement executed several search warrants during those
two years and routinely found guns in his home.109 A jury convicted
Urkevich of one count of conspiracy with intent to distribute meth
and three counts of possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking
offense.110 He received fifty-five years on gun charges alone, due to
the old § 924(c) stacking provision.111 The court was the first in the
country to grant a motion to reduce a sentence based in part on
§ 924(c) sentencing disparities.112 After holding that courts were
empowered to determine what co
e district court considered the
113

After considering these
factors, the court reduced Urkevich
have been sentenced to post-FSA.114 It is important to note that the
court did not grant Urkevich imme
his sentence for each stacked § 924(c) count.115
A few months after the Urkevich court boldly granted a sentence
reduction based largely on sentencing disparities, the COVID-19
116
A little over a year after Congress removed the BOP as the compassionate release gatekeeper,
litigation flooded the courts.117 Many defendants started petitioning

108. United States v. Urkevich, 408 F.3d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Urkevich, 2019 WL 6037391, at *1.
112. See id. at *3 (noting that one other court considered a motion with similar facts but
declined to grant the motion, finding it premature).
113. Id. at *2-3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
114. See id. at *4.
115. Id.
116. See Keri Blakinger, Thousands of Sick Federal Prisoners Sought Release as Covid-19
Spread. Nearly All Were Denied., NBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/thousands-sick-federal-prisoners-sought-release-covid-19-spread-nearlyn1242193 [https://perma.cc/9L38-9N6B].
117. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239; Clare
Hymes, Compassionate Release, Once Seldom Used, Offers Some Federal Inmates Hope, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 18, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/compassionate-release-fed
eral-inmates-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/4U52-VZPZ].
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the courts directly, requesting relief based on the pandemic, rehabilitative efforts, and § 924(c) sentencing disparities.118
Circuit courts are split on whether district court judges have the
authority to grant compassionate release (or a reduced sentence)
based on § 924(c) sentencing disparities.119 For example, the Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. McCoy
created by the First Step Act.120 The court, however, emphasized the
including consideration of defend

121

On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Thacker,
122

compelling reason for a sentenc-

Many courts, even the ones that have held that a lack of retroactivity does not preclude the defendant from relief, avoid firmly
deciding this issue by granting release based on a combination of
factors. The McCoy district court, for example, granted compassionthe overall length of his sentence, his impressive rehabilitative
efforts, and § 924(c) sentencing disparities.123 The Decator court
considered the same factors before granting compassionate release.124 In April 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reconsidered a
motion for compassionate release.125 The court denied the defendraconian sentence that modern statute would prohibit if given
126
The court had found that although the § 924(c) sentencing
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See generally United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 575 (7th Cir. 2021).
981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id.
4 F.4th at 576.
2020 WL 2738225, at *6.
452 F. Supp. 3d at 325-26.
United States v. Brown, 457 F. Supp. 3d 691, 693-94 (S.D. Iowa 2020).
Id. at 694.
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disparities did seem extraordinary and compelling, it needed an
127
On the motion for
128

A couple of weeks later, in May 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic,129 the District Court for the Western District of Virginia took
a bold stance.130 In United States v. Arey, after considering the
health conditions, the court found that the global pandemic did not
alone create an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.131
the now amended § 924(c) statute alone was a sufficient reason for
relief.132
finding that granting release on a sentencing disparity alone is pers decision to make the stacking
133
provision non-retroactive. The Fourth Circuit has not reversed
This Note argues that courts should follow the Arey approach.
Where the change in law to § 924(c) is new, unclear, and conflicts
with other statutes (specifically, the sentencing guidelines section
1B1.13 commentary),134 courts should use their independent
discretion to correct the wrongs created by Congress. This argument
is supported by legislative history, policy considerations, and the
basic notions of fairness.

127. Id. at 701.
128. Id.
129. See Daily Updates of Totals by Week and State: Provisional Death Counts for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ6P-ZXDY].
130. See generally United States v. Arey, 461 F. Supp. 3d 343 (W.D. Va. 2020).
131. Id. at 345, 351.
132. Id. at 351.
133. Id. at 350-51.
134. See supra Section I.A.2.
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III. THE SECOND STEP: SECTION 924(C) SENTENCING DISPARITIES
ALONE CONSTITUTE AN EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING
REASON FOR RELEASE
As district courts across the country have concluded, courts are
empowered under the First Step Act to determine what factors
constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate
release. Courts can and should use this power to grant compassionate release to defendants whose § 924(c) convictions do not reflect
the new sentencing scheme for three reasons: (1) Congress never
intended for § 924(c) to require sentence stacking; (2) these defendants will always satisfy at least two of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors; and (3) incarcerating these defendants beyond the current
sentencing scheme does not further any correctional goals. When a
defendant initiates individualized review by petitioning the court,
the presiding judge should keep these points in mind and take the
step Congress did not take itself by granting compassionate release.
A. Extraordinary and Compelling: Serving a Mandatory
Minimum Sentence Congress Never Intended to Create
Congress empowered courts with significant discretion to grant
compassionate release motions in the very same act Congress
amended the § 924(c) stacking provision.135 Section 403 of the FSA
Congress never intended for courts to stack multiple § 924(c) count
sentences.136 The Supreme Court, however, in Deal v. United States,
interpreted the ambiguous language in the original § 924(c) statute
to require the stacking provision.137
In 1993, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, interpreted the
statute as requiring district court
138
Specifically, the Court held that the word
135.
5239.
136.
137.
138.

See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, §§ 403(b), 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222,
See id. § 403.
See 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993).
See id. at 132 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
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to the finding of guilt by a
judge or jury that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment
139

140

Twenty-six years later, Congress
pretation and clarified the manner in which district courts should
sentence defendants with multiple § 924(c) counts.141 This clarification is significant. Defendants who did not retroactively receive the
sentence leniency of the § 924(c) amendment are not only facing
time Congress no longer deems necessary; they are also facing time
Congress never believed to be necessary.
Now that Congress has spoken and clarified its stance on the
§ 924(c) stacking provision, it is up to courts to correct the injustice
defendants faced by being sentenced under the previously faulty
interpretation. Although Congress chose not to exert its own power
to make the amended § 924(c) statute retroactive, this does not
mean that courts should refrain from using their power to remedy
this wrong. Congress implicitly acknowledged in the title of the
142

The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa correctly prowould take too much effort to ma
and those who appear before them should not hesitate to use their
143

B. Section 924(c) Sentencing Disparities: Always a Match for
Certain Statutory Sentencing Factors
When courts consider a motion for compassionate release, they
must determine whether the defendant presents extraordinary
and compelling reasons for release by looking at certain enumerated factors when making their decisions. Congress specified in its
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
See id. at 138 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also First Step Act § 403(b).
See First Step Act § 403(b).
United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 454 (S.D. Iowa 2020).
Id.
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amended compassionate release statute that courts must consider
the extent that they are appli144
The statute lists seven broad factors.145 Defendants who
did not retroactively receive the sentence leniency of the § 924(c)
amendment will always invoke two sentencing factors that courts
must weigh when they consider compassionate release motions.
First, each defendant who petitions the court for release or a
reduced sentence based on § 924(c) sentencing disparities satisfies
146

Clearly, a judge deciding
a compassionate release motion for a defendant sentenced under the
prior version of § 924(c) would find that this factor heavily tips in
sentences defendants receive under the present law.147
Take for instance the cases of Steven Houston and Kenya Williams: Houston was sentenced to thirty-two years for two § 924(c)
charges, while Williams faced only twenty-one years for three
§ 924(c) charges.148 Judges, however, do not need an extraordinary
Any defendant convicted of two or more § 924(c) violations before
convicted of the same offenses after December 21, 2018. 149
Second, each defendant sentenced before the First Step Act passfor the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense
150
Because Congress never believed (or, at the very least, no longer believes) that
such lengthy sentences are needed, this factor also tips in the
151

144. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
145. Id. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
146. See id. § 3553(a)(6); see also § 3582(c)(1)(A).
147. See supra Part I.B.
148. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
149. See McCoy v. United States, No. 2:03-cr-197, 2020 WL 2738225, at *6 (E.D. Va. May
26, 2020).
150. See § 3553(a)(2)(A); see also § 3582(c)(1)(A).
151. See supra Part III.A.
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Of note, many of the other § 3553(a) factors are simply irrelevant to defendants petitioning for compassionate release based on
§ 924(c) sentencing disparities. For example, courts must consider
152

compassionate release policy statement has not been updated to
reflect the changes to the First Step Act and is thus not pertinent.153
Step Act are no longer available.154
In sum, the § 3553(a) sentencing factors that a court must consider when deciding a motion for compassionate release provide
ample support for a court to conclude that the § 924(c) sentencing
disparities constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for
release.
C. Section 924(c) Sentencing Disparities: Never a Match for
Correctional Goals or the Basic Notions of Fairness
Courts, when determining whether to grant compassionate
release due to certain sentencing disparities, should consider correctional goals. These include deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.155 None of these goals are satisfied by
keeping defendants in prison for decades longer than what Congress
currently deems satisfactory.156
First, common sense dictates that
nued incarceration of defendants
for longer than what is currently statutorily required. If we assume,
for the sake of argument, that the purpose of the federal sentencing
scheme is to deter crime, the elimination of the stacking provision
demonstrates that the previously lengthy sentences were not necessary to deter crime. As such, there is no support for continuing
152. § 3553(a)(5).
153. See supra Part I.A.2.
154. § 3553(a)(3); see First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194,
5222.
155. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
logical justification is by its nature
156. See id.
disproportionate to
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to uphold a nullified and antiquated sentencing scheme as a means
of deterrence. Those who possess, brandish, or discharge a firearm
during multiple crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses no
longer fear the old stacking provision of § 924(c). Additionally, many
defendants are likely unaware of the enhanced punishments associated with gun charges, making deterrence as a whole ineffective at lowering crime rates.157
Likewise, courts cannot rely on rehabilitation or incapacitation as
Again, for the sake of argument, if we assume that the purpose of
the sentencing guidelines is to rehabilitate defendants, the § 924(c)
amendment suggests that defendants can be rehabilitated by serving a five-, seven-, or ten-year sentence for each § 924(c) count.158 It
is important to note that under the new sentencing scheme, defendants need not prove a record of rehabilitative efforts to be released
after serving their time.159 This suggests that rehabilitation as a
general correctional goal does not justify incarcerating defendants
longer than what is statutorily prescribed, no matter the individual
characteristics of each defendant.160
Additionally, the § 924(c) amendment suggests that defendants
only need to be incapacitated for the time currently statutorily
prescribed.161 To reason otherwise would be logically unsound:
suggesting that defendants sentenced on or before December 21,
2018, like Steven Houston, are inherently more dangerous or
deserving of incapacitation than defendants sentenced after December 21, 2018, like Kenya Williams, is nonsensical.
Finally, courts cannot rely on retribution as justification to deny
a defendant for the wrong he has
committed.162 Following the same logic above, now that the First
Step Act has amended § 924(c), sentencing first-time offenders as
157. See Athula Pathinayake, Should We Deter Against General Deterrence?, 9 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL Y 63, 88-89 (2018).
158. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 34-35.
leased by the Bureau of Prisons on the
159. See
160. See id.
161. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 34-35.
162. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
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repeat offenders is no longer considered necessary to sufficiently
punish defendants.163 Thus, it does not follow that defendants sentenced under the old scheme should receive harsher punishment.
Putting aside all of the justifications for incarceration, judges
should consider fairness. That our justice system allows for a
defendant sentenced one day before a congressional vote to be
sentenced decades longer than a defendant sentenced for the same
crimes one day later violates all basic notions of fairness. History is
repeating itself: Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010,
reducing the sentencing disparities between offenses for crack and
powder cocaine, but it did not originally make the sentencing
amendments retroactive.164
the United States Sentencing Commission voted to retroactively
apply the new sentencing guidelines.165 Here, Congress once again
took a small step towards fairness, but courts now must take another step. These sentencing disparities, like those created by the
Fair Sentencing Act, warrant sentence reductions.
District courts have the discretion to grant compassionate release
whenever they find extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief
present.166
sentencing scheme, § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and the common
penological goals, the § 924(c) sentencing disparities Congress created are alone extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief.
or the presence of a global pandemic to release defendants serving
grossly unjust sentences. This Note argues that the § 924(c) sentencing disparities are a greater reason for release than a defennt of their rehabilitative efforts.
IV. ADDRESSING LIKELY COUNTERARGUMENTS
Despite legislative history, sentencing factors, correctional goals,
and the basic notions of fairness all pointing to the idea that courts
163. See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 34-35.
164. Fair Sentencing Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-lawreform/fair-sentencing-act [https://perma.cc/6CYK-YGBD].
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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should grant compassionate release to defendants sentenced under
the old § 924(c) sentencing scheme, there are pertinent, likely counterarguments. This Part addresse
First, courts using their compassionate release power to grant
release to defendants based solely on § 924(c) sentencing disparities
are likely to be critiqued for intervening with congressional intent.
Critics may argue that courts cannot in essence make retroactive a
law that Congress explicitly made non-retroactive. However, as detailed above, Congress amended § 924(c) in the same act that it gave
courts broad power to determine
167
Congress thus opted for an individualized review process through the courts rather than releasing every defendant sentenced under the old scheme at once. 168
Second, critics may also raise concerns with courts creating uncertainty in sentencing. The goal commonly associated with determinate sentencing schemes is increasing certainty in the amount of
time served.169 This principle exists largely to comfort crime victims
and society as a whole.170 But incarcerating defendants beyond the
statutorily proscribed time period in order to comfort victims is not
justifiable. The criminal justice system does not regularly accommo, although sometimes taking victim impact statements into account
sentence.171 Defendants currently serving multiple § 924(c) sentences under the prior stacking scheme face decades of extra time
compared to their peers who were sentenced under the current
scheme.172
serve his original sentence with the 5,475 minimum additional

167. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. See ALISON LAWRENCE, MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE SYSTEMS AND POLICIES
4 (2015), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/35FW-WLHJ].
170. See id.
171. See Robert C. Davis, Frances Kunreuther & Elizabeth Connick, Expanding the Vicional Process: The Results of an Experiment, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 492 (1984).
172. See supra Part I.B.
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days that the defendant must serve under the outdated law,173
Finally, critics may question whether this Note argues that any
sentencing disparity should be grounds for compassionate release.
Because judges often give vastly different sentences for the same
crime, granting compassionate release on that ground alone would
open up doors to thousands of inmates.174 This Note, however, only
argues that sentencing disparities created by the § 924(c) amendment warrant reduced sentences. That Congress indirectly created
the § 924(c) sentencing disparities distinguishes them from ordinary
sentencing disparities. Disparities created by the § 924(c) amendcteristics. These distinctions draw
on for a reduced sentence.
CONCLUSION
Congress took the first step by clarifying the § 924(c) sentencing
scheme; courts must now take the
wrongs. Steven Oneil Houston and countless other inmates sit
behind federal prison bars, knowing that they were sentenced to
prison time Congress itself finds excessive. Meanwhile, Kenya
Williams, along with every defendant convicted of multiple § 924(c)
violations and sentenced after December 21, 2018, serve decades
less time under the new and more progressive scheme.
When Kenya Williams reaches the end of his sentence, the Bureau of Prisons will not require an in-depth review of his (arbitrary)
rehabilitative efforts. He will not be required to prove extraordinary
or compelling reasons for release. Instead, he will be escorted out of
jail without having to file a motion with the court and regardless of
173. The closest gap between the prior sentencing scheme and the current sentencing
scheme that could occur is fifteen years. A defendant who discharged a gun twice and was
sentenced before the FSA passed would receive a thirty-five year sentence (10 years for the
first count and 25 years for the second). See U.S. SENT G COMM N, supra note 10, at 34-35. A
defendant with the same charges who was sentenced post-FSA would receive a twenty-year
sentence (two 10-year sentences). See id.
174. See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1269-70 (2014).
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his conduct while in prison. Congress, as detailed in the text of the
First Step Act, presumes that Williams is deserving of release. Why,
then, are district courts requiring so much from defendants similarly situated to Steven Houston?
District courts are reluctant to intrude into congressional territory, but Congress gave them an extraordinary amount of discretion.175 In the same act, Congress amended § 924(c) and provided
defendants sentenced under the prior version a method for individualized review.176 Each defendant that petitions a court for compassionate release due to § 924(c) sentencing disparities has several
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors weighing in his or her favor.177 Absent
unusual circumstances (for instance, an inmate who has a significantly increased propensity for violence since being incarcerated),
each of these defendants sentenced under the old § 924(c) scheme
will have an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.
Courts cannot count on Congress, and they cannot count on prosecutors, to fix these injustices in the criminal justice system. No one
convicted of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence or a
drug trafficking offense should serve more time than a terrorist or
murderer,178 even if they actually wielded a gun. Congress signaled
an understanding of this idea by fundamentally changing the law.
It is now time for courts to take the second step that Congress was
not willing to take itself.

175. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239; supra
Part III.A.
176. See First Step Act §§ 403(b), 603(b).
177. See supra Part III.B.
178. See United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2017) (Torruella, J., dissenting)).
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